The Rush to Motherhood: Pronatalist Discourse and Women&#39;s Autonomy

Diana Meyers

While the racial bias in classical feminist theory has been corrected, the class bias of these middle-class theories still needs to be addressed. In this article, I argue that there has been a neglect of the culture of white working-class women in gender studies. First, when scholars study white women, the privilege of whiteness tends to overshadow class differences. Second, when class is discussed, it is more likely to be the poor class or middle class, with the working class folded into one of these bimodal humps. Third, working-class behavior is examined mostly in the work place where class identities rather than gender are emphasized. Moreover, white working-class women’s lives are anchored as much in the home as they are in the workplace. Ignoring this private sphere limits our understanding of how gender identities are classed.

Logos, the expressed word, empowers. "God said, 'Let there be light,' And there was light" (Gen. 1:3). By the act of speech, God ascribed reality and assigned meaning to the object of his desire. Inevi-tably, man arrogated this divine power to himself: "Out of the ground the ...

Family scholars have explored in depth how and why some women choose to never have children. However, some childless-by-choice (also termed childfree or voluntarily childless) women—who have declared their desire and intention to never have children—ultimately become mothers because of changes in choice or circumstance. Through a qualitative analysis of interviews with mothers who once articulated themselves as permanently childless by choice, this article presents three facets of agency in women's stories about childbearing transformations: accidental conception, ambiguous desire, and purposeful decision. Participant interviews indicated that each facet of agency was enabled and constrained by multiple individual , relational, and cultural considerations, including self-described biological urges, partners' childbearing desires and intentions, and cultural stigma against abortion. Pathways from childless by choice to mother often encompass multiple facets of agency and include movements in and out of various fertility desires and intentions before conceiving.

The Rush to Motherhood: Pronatalist Discourse and Women's Autonomy Author(s): Diana Tietjens Meyers Source: Signs, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Spring, 2001), pp. 735-773 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175538 Accessed: 02-11-2016 14:31 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Signs This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Diana T i etjens M eyers The Rush to Motherhood-Pronatalist Discourse and Women's Autonomy o choice has a more profound impact on a woman's life than her deci- sion whether or not to become a mother.1 Bound up with sexuality and gender identity, choices about childbearing and motherhood are emotionally gripping and socially pivotal. They affect one's attitude toward oneself--self-esteem may be enhanced, or it may suffer. They condition others' judgments - although very young women, aging women, and poor women are discouraged from becoming mothers, women who prefer not to have any children under any circumstances are commonly reproached for selfishness or pitied for immaturity. They position women with respect to a fundamental social structure and moral situation--the family. As a legal institution, the family sanctions some child-bearing decisions and censures others. As a customary nexus of affection and sustenance, it assigns distinct tasks and responsibilities to different family members. Through motherhood decisions, then, women assume an indelible moral identity and incur or disavow various caregiving obligations. Moreover, since the family does not exist in isolation from other social systems, I am grateful to Sandra Bartky, Wendy Donner, Jennifer Heckard, Jennifer Radden, and Sally Ruddick for their invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this article. Two anonymous reviewers for Signs provided probing and enormously helpful comments on an earlier draft as well. In addition, I would like to thank the whole staff of the interlibrary loan service at Homer Babbidge Library, with special thanks to Lynn Sweet. The library's collection proved wholly inadequate for my research on this article, and Lynn and her colleagues cheer- fully and expeditiously provided me with extensive and indispensable assistance. I shall be concerned exclusively with autonomy in deciding whether or not to become a mother, and I shall not take up the question of autonomy in the activity of maternal caregiving, which raises very different issues. In this article, then, phrases such as "motherhood decisions" and "decisions about motherhood" refer only to women's initial undertaking. This decision typically involves a decision about childbearing. But I would emphasize that deciding to give birth to a child does not entail deciding to become a mother, for a woman may choose to put her child up for adoption, and also that deciding to become a mother does not entail deciding to bear a child, for a woman may choose to adopt. Although I shall sometimes use the expressions "procreative autonomy," "reproductive autonomy," and "having children" to refer to the decision about whether to become a mother, I do not mean to rule out becoming a mother through adoption. [Signs:Journal of Women in Culture and Society 2001, vol. 26, no. 3] ? 2001 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/2001/2603-0004$02.00 This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 736 I Meyers women's motherhood decisionsdecisions have implications their extradomestic women's motherhood have for implications for their e aspirations. As a As result of the interpenetration of the family and econaspirations. a result of the interpenetration ofthe the family a omy and the the organization of the economy to economy suit a prototypical employee omy and organization of the to suit a prototypica who supposed to be exempt from caregiving maternity usuwhois is supposed to be exempt fromobligations, caregiving obligations, mat ally women's employment opportunities, their prospects for promoallylimits limits women's employment opportunities, their prospects tion, and their long-range earning power. In sum, a woman's motherhood tion, and their long-range earning power. In sum, a woman's m decision is crucial to her to personal of herdefinitive social per- of her decision is crucial her well-being, personal definitive well-being, sona, and predictive of her economic sona, and predictive of her horizons. economic horizons. Because motherhood decisions are singularly and unsurBecause motherhood decisions arepersonal singularly personal an passably important, feminists have long struggled to secure women'sto au-secure passably important, feminists have long struggled tonomy over thesethese decisions. DemandingDemanding that women's right procreate right to tonomy over decisions. thatto women's be feminists have opposed methods of curbing fertility, berespected, respected, feminists havecoercive opposed coercive methods of curbi such as as forced sterilization and withholding welfare supplements for new such forced sterilization and withholding welfare supplemen babies. In In addition, they have campaigned for the right to choose to babies. addition, they have campaigned for thenot right to c procreatethatthat is, foris, fully funded contraception and unrestricted access procreatefor fully funded contraception and unrestri to abortion. One result of these initiatives in the United States is that women's moth- erhood decisions are now surrounded by a highly voluntaristic rhetoric. Arguing that women should be free to choose whether to bring a pregnancy to term, the abortion rights movement dubs its position "prochoice." Similarly, the expressionfamilyplanning presumes that the timing of reproduction is a matter of choice. It is worth noticing, however, that the conception of choice invoked by advocates of reproductive freedom is lopsided. The idea is to empower women to delay or space out childbearing. Seldom, if ever, explicitly mentioned, the option of altogether abstain- ing is implicitly denied. Since the current (albeit outmoded) paradigm of the family is a social unit comprised of a heterosexual couple and their children, the concept of family planning does not include refusing to have children, for that would amount to family prevention, which sounds like blasphemy in an era of pietistic pronouncements about "family values." Evidently, the scope of socially condoned autonomy with respect to moth- erhood is far less extensive than it initially appears to be. Indeed, I am convinced that even where both the right to procreate and the right to refrain from procreating are tolerably secure, women's decisions about childbearing and motherhood are seldom as autonomous as they could be. In my judgment, then, winning these legal guarantees, although absolutely vital, still falls short of achieving feminist emancipatory goals. Preliminary to arguing these points, I shall sketch an account of autonomy that links autonomy to feminist critiques of the silencing of women's voices (Sec. I). The skills-based view of autonomy I endorse is designed to accommodate a socially and relationally situated self and to differentiate This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 1 737 degrees of autonomy both when the individual elects a conventio and when the individual heads out on an uncharted route. Any conc of autonomy that did not fulfill these desiderata would be useless f poses of analyzing women's motherhood decisions. Turning to t tion of women's autonomy over these decisions, I shall rely on my a of autonomy to interpret women's testimony about their decisions come or not to become mothers, and I shall urge that women's a in this respect is often compromised (Sec. II). In response to thi bleak assessment, an objection might arise to the effect that I manding more autonomy over motherhood decisions than anyo realistically have or want. I shall address this concern by arguing th tonomy over whether or not to become a mother is possible as desirable (Sec. III). To grasp how such autonomy can be gained, it is n sary to identify the social conditions that commonly defeat it and th egies some women have used to overcome these constraints. Thu diagnose a substantial social obstacle to women's autonomy over hood decisions-the discourse of matrigyno-idolatry (Sec. IV). T shall show how some women have circumvented this pronatalist oly, and I shall recommend two ways in which feminist politics can this hostile discursive environment and expand the scope of all autonomy (Sec. V). I. Voice and choice-a feminist view of autonomy Canonical autonomy theories represent the autonomous individ self-originating, self-interested, self-sufficient, coldly rational, shr calculating, adult male. Appalled by this individualist, antirelatio some feminists have repudiated autonomy.2 Yet, many feminist continue to invoke ostensibly discredited values like self-determinat unguarded writing about the needs of women and the aims of nism (e.g., de Lauretis 1986, 10; Lugones and Spelman 1986, 20; 1988, 72). In light of women's history of being figured as at the of their reproductive biology and in need of rational male guida in light of women's history of enforced economic dependence on relegation to poorly paid, often despised forms of labor, femin hardly ignore the topic of self-determination. A number of feminis ars have taken up this challenge and rallied to the explicit defense o omy. But, of course, their reconceptualizations of autonomy end answer feminist charges that reclaiming autonomy will prove antith 2 For example, Jaggar 1983; Addelson 1994; Hekman 1995; Card 1996. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 738 I Meyers to revaluing the interpersonal capacities that are conventionally inine.3 Another group of feminist scholars has translated the i have traditionally occupied autonomy theorists into a vocabular Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman observe that havin "integral to leading a life rather than being led through it" and silenced in one's own account of one's life is a kind of amp signals oppression" (1986, 20; emphasis added). Silencing disa for the alternative to articulating your own experience and you in yTour own wav is to live someone else's version of you -to in definition of what you are like and their conception of wha feel, and want and consequently to find yourself enacting their hoNw your life should go (Frye 1997, 412-13; P. Williams 1 Walker 1998, 127-28). What motivates feminist voice theory that women are systematically denied the opportunity to disco selves for themselves, to interpret themselves as they think fit, their lives according to their own lights. These are the very sam that animate autonomy theory-self-determination, and the knowledge and self-definition in securing self-determination. This overlap notwithstanding, feminist wariness of autonomy warranted, for the major accounts of autonomy do not serv Twell. Many of these accounts take the individual's values, desir as givens and prescribe strategies for organizing them into a co isfaction-maximizing life plan. But exempting an autonomous p ues, desires, and goals from critical reflection and fundamental tion is plausible only if one assumes a background of social just nowhere evccn approximated. Knowing what one wants and figure out hoxw to get it in a society that generally respects p liberties does not suffice for autonomy when one's aims are mi contorted and cramped by structures of domination and sub Since no woman can completely screen out misogynist attitu orizing styles of deportment, and subordination-sustaining masterfully integrating her values, desires, and goals can be contented collusion with male dominance- a travesty of autono accounts of autonomy recognize this problem and seek to expos ternalized oppression obstructs autonomy- for example, by pre dividuals from appreciating good reasons for acting or by fore hopes of flourishing as worthy human beings. The drawback of 3 For example, Ncdelskx 1989, 7; Mevers 1989, 2000; Govier 1993, 103 1995, 21; W'eir 1995, 263. 4 For a ricl account of internalizing oppression, see BartkA 1990, 77-78. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 I 739 is that they overlook the agentic capacities that women exercise oppression. Stigmatizing women as victims, they reinstate the risibl of the helpless female that feminists have rightly debunked. As fem voice theorists have stressed, when women do not tell their own their lives are depicted as exercises in abject submission or deranged conformity. But this picture is shallow and misleading. Plainly, a fe view of autonomy must acknowledge that oppression impedes au without stripping women of the autonomy that they have man wrest from a patriarchal, racist, heterosexist, class-stratified world. Autonomy theory's tendency to polarize people into free agen incompetent dependents justifiably gives feminists pause. So it i standable that many of them opt to address issues of self-determ through a theory of voice and narrative instead. Still, feminist voic has problems, too. Voice theory cannot do without an account of ho gets in touch with oneself and finds one's own voice. It is not en invent an interesting protagonist and spin a good yarn about her life true, moreover, that all women's psyches and bodies are liable to int oppression, it is necessary to distinguish when women are speaking own voices and when they are lip-syncing the ominous baritone of p archy. In particular, a feminist voice theory must explain how t guish between a woman's ideologically oppressed voice and her e pated voice and between the voice of a progressive feminist ideo the voice of the individual woman. I shall refer to this as the pr voice authentication. Two solutions to this epistemological quanda gest themselves. One possibility would be to authenticate voices by checking o contexts of origin. Arguably, the administrative assistant who la her boss's lewd remarks while hoping for a promotion, the abused w who forgives her batterer to keep the family's paycheck coming in, adolescent who yearns for love and hates fleshy female bodies do no in their own voices, for their social contexts relentlessly and forcefu sure them to mouth a patriarchal line. In contrast, feminist separat tices create safe enclaves in which no woman is penalized for rej demeaning, distorting self-description and in which each woman is to conceive alternative means of articulating her sense of self and her Feminist standpoint theory suggests a somewhat different appro dialectic of political struggle and theoretical understanding might b as differentiating the oppressed voice from the emancipated voic sock 1997, 465). On this reading, the emancipated voice would be 5 For a related discussion, see Frye 1997, 407-8. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 740 I Meyers that unmasked oppression-perpetuating falsifications byfalsifications joining with thathas has unmasked oppression-perpetuating by join others to to challenge social structures, by analyzing by how analyzing these structures others challenge social structures, how these maintain the the statusstatus quo andquo who and is benefiting this setup,from and by this envi- setup, an maintain who isfrom benefiting sioning a society free offree repression and exploitation. neither of these sioning a society of repression andBut exploitation. But neithe proposals seems altogether satisfactory. While it is undeniable feminist proposals seems altogether satisfactory. While that it is undeniable th separatist contexts can authorize women to find their own voices, their it is also separatist contexts can authorize women to find own voice necessary to bear in mind separatist can deteriorate into a deteri necessary to bear inthat mind that contexts separatist contexts can dynamic of mutually reinforcing, escalating misperception muddle. dynamic of mutually reinforcing, escalatingand misperception a Furthermore, mandating oppositional politics as a prerequisite forathe selfFurthermore, mandating oppositional politics as prerequisite f understanding needed to speakto in one's own is insufficiently understanding needed speak invoice one's own voice respectis insufficient ful women's uniqueness as individuals. An epistemology that does not fulofof women's uniqueness as individuals. An epistemology th do to women's individuality is hardly suited to a feminist account dojustice justice to women's individuality is hardly suited to a feminis of self-determination. Another possibility would be to conceptualize the emancipated, individual voice as one that expresses a set of objective values, such as flourishing, self-respect, and dignity (Babbitt 1997, 380-81). The trouble with this suggestion is that such values must be interpreted, and these interpre- tations are inescapably contestable. Since the meaning of these values is not transparent, people are bound to disagree about whether an individual's self-description and self-narrative comport with them. Whereas some wome den idtif flourishing with being a devoted mother and a reliable helpmeet, others regard a life dedicated to homemaking as squandering a woman's potential. Now, if we extricate ourselves from such clashes of judgment by agreeing to disagree, congruity with objective values could not function as a criterion for authenticating women's voices. If anyone who frames her life story as a tale of flourishing, self-respect, and dignity is by definition speaking in her own voice regardless of how she is actually living, voice theory would lose both the power to discern internalized op- pression and the grounds for critiquing alien, culturally ordained narratives. Appealing to objective values could only authenticate women's voices if the meanings of these values were uncontroversial. Despite my qualms about these ways of filling the epistemological lacuna in voice theory, each strikes me as promising. Still, none can be accepted without supplementation, and none should be privileged as the sole way of authenticating women's voices. The attractiveness of these proposals depends, I believe, on unstated assumptions about women's agentic capacities. The worries that the insularity of a separatist context can foster misguided, possibly dangerous, convictions and that the values of flourishing, self-respect, and dignity are too indeterminate to provide touchstones for authenticating voices are allayed if we assume that the participants in separatist projects and the interpreters This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 I 741 of these thesevalues values exercise that enable reflect intelligently an of exercise skillsskills that enable them tothem reflecttointelligently and judgeconscientiously. conscientiously. Likewise, undertaking define flourishing, s judge Likewise, undertaking to definetoflourishing, self- respect,and and dignity sharply enough tothese make these values voice au respect, dignity sharply enough to make values useful voiceuseful authenticators is less worrisome if we assume that women themselves are defining these values while exercising skills that attune them to conflicts between proposed interpretations and their own needs and aspirations as well as skills that enable them to resist detrimental interpretations effectively. If I am right that the above objections to using context or content to authenticate women's voices are neutralized when women are seen as endowed with agentic skills of the sort I have mentioned, it must be because these skills enable women to discern what they really want and care about and because they enable women to improvise ways to express their own values and goals - both in the medium of speech and in that of action. To set out the agentic skills needed to provide feminist voice theory with a credible epistemology is, in short, to articulate an implicit theory of autonomy. A theory of how one's own desires, values, and goals can be differentiated from the clamor of subordinating discourses and overwhelming social demands and how one can articulate and enact one's own desires, values, and goals is a theory of self-determination. Here are some of the skills that are constitutive of the process of self-determination: 1. introspective skills that sensitize individuals to their own feelings and desires, that enable them to interpret their subjective experience, and that help them judge how good a likeness a self-portrait is; 2. communication skills that enable individuals to get the benefit of others' perceptions, background knowledge, insights, advice, and support; 3. memory skills that enable individuals to recall relevant experiences - not only from their own lives but also experiences that associates have recounted or that they have encountered in literature or other art forms; 4. imaginative skills that enable individuals to envisage feasible options -to audition a range of self-images they might adopt and to preview a variety of plotlines their lives might follow; 5. analytical skills and reasoning skills that enable individuals to assess the relative merits of different visions of what they could be like and scenarios for future episodes in their life stories; 6. volitional skills that enable individuals to resist pressure to capitulate to convention and that enable them to maintain their commitment to the self-portrait and to the continuations of their autobiographies that they consider genuinely their own; and This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 742 I Meyers 7. interpersonal interpersonal thatindividuals enable individuals join forces to 7. skillsskills that enable to join forces to to challenge andchange change cultural regimes that pathologize margina and cultural regimes that pathologize or marginalizeor their priorities projects and thatthem deprive of means the discurs priorities andand projects and that deprive of the them discursive torepresent represent themselves to themselves and to others as flou to themselves to themselves and to others as flourishing, self-respecting, valuable individuals.6 self-respecting, valuable individuals.6 What I am suggesting that autonomous people have wellWhat I am suggesting is that is autonomous people have well-developed, well-coordinated repertories of agentic skills and call onasthem r well-coordinated repertories of agentic skills and call on them routinely theyreflect reflect on themselves and decisions as theyabout reach dec they on themselves and theirand livestheir and as lives they reach howbest best to on.7 go When on.7 When woman speaks in her own voice, how to go a womanaspeaks in her own voice, then, she is articulating she knows asofa exercising result of exercising these skills articulating whatwhat she knows as a result these skills. Thisview view of autonomy and women's does not pigeon This of autonomy and women's voices does voices not pigeonhole people asfree free agents as incompetent dependents. On it the one hand, i as agents or asor incompetent dependents. On the one hand, acknowledges the gravity of internalized but it also edges the gravity of internalized oppression,oppression, but it also explains how ex- explains ercising agentic canwomen enable women ercising agentic skillsskills can enable gradually to gradually overcome it. to On overc theother other hand, it acknowledges that women achieve a measu the hand, it acknowledges that women achieve a measure of self- determination despite male dominance. Sincewith proficiency determination despite male dominance. Since proficiency respect to with agentic skills is a matter of and degree, gains often in autonomy of agentic skills is a matter of degree, gains inand autonomy depend on whether or not the circumstances one finds oneself in are conducive to exercising these skills and on whether or not one is motivated to exercise these skills, it is safe to assume that, like everyone else, women experience autonomy fluctuations in different areas of life and over the course of time. Reconfiguring autonomy this way supplies a missing component in feminist voice theory while at the same time incorporating voice theory's key insights. As Lugones and Spelman urge, self-determination is insepar- able from speaking in one's own voice.8 If people cannot articulate what 6 For a discussion of these skills, see Meyers 1989, 76-91. For a related discussion of the role of autobiographical narrative in the constitution of self-identity and agency, see Giddens 1991, chaps. 2 and 3; and Benhabib 1999. 71 would like to refer readers to an intriguing psychological discussion of the experience of control that lends support to mv skills-based approach to autonomy. Ellen J. Langer and Justin Pugh Brown observe that psychologists have generally identified experiences of control with the ability to dictate or predict an outcome, and they argue that this conception is misguided. Reflecting on the problematics of control and self-blame in the psychology of victims of sexual violence, they maintain, instead, that one experiences control when one is "mindful of the choice one w as making" - i.e., when one regards oneself as an able decision maker and made one's decision in a thoughtful way (1992, 269, 273). Presumably, individuals who developed proficiency with respect to the agentic skills I have enumerated are more likely to view themselves as good decision makers, more likely to exercise those skills when confronted with choices, and therefore more likely to feel in control of their lives. If culture-transcending free will is an illusion (as I believe it is), there can be nothing more to self-determination than feeling in control as a result of competent decision making. x It might be objected that the premium feminist voice theory places on articulateness betrays a racial and class bias. I do not believe, however, that articulateness is raced or classed. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G NS Spring 2001 743 they areare doingdoing and what theywhat stand for to themselves, theirto control over they and they stand for themselves, the how they are engaging with the world is diminished. Moreover, they need how they are engaging with the world is diminished. More to what they are doing andare whatdoing they stand forwhat to others in stand tocommunicate communicate what they and they order to obtain respect respect and cooperation. people will rely on order to obtain and Otherwise, cooperation. Otherwise, peo stereotypical imagesimages and scenarios to scenarios ascribe needs to to them and toneeds interpret stereotypical and ascribe to them their conduct. My skills-based view of autonomy features the linguistic and their conduct. My skills-based view of autonomy features interpersonal skills people need to accomplish aims. interpersonal skills people need these to accomplish these aims. In my processual approach to autonomy concurs with femiInaddition, addition, my processual approach to autonomy conc nist voice theory's tenet thattenet gainingthat a voicegaining is an achievement andis that nist voice theory's a voice an achie social context affectsaffects women's ability to speakability in their own voices. Some social context women's to speak in their contexts nurture agentic skills, facilitate exercising them, and authorize contexts nurture agentic skills, facilitate exercising the people to apply them tothem the taskto of the rethinking values. people to apply taskand ofreconstructing rethinking and recons II would caution, however,however, that separatist groups and progressive political would caution, that separatist groups and pro organizations are notare the only sites. Other settings organizations notautonomy-augmenting the only autonomy-augmenting sites include friendships and otherand intimate relationships, psychotherapy, and include friendships other intimate relationships, ps mentoring relationships (Brison 1997, 20-31). At1997, least since VirginiaAt least mentoring relationships (Brison 20-31). Woolf pennedA Room ofOne's Own, moreover, feminists have championed Woolf pennedA Room ofOne's Own, moreover, feminists h solitude as a as resource for finding one'sfinding voice, and it is important notice solitude a resource for one's voice,toand it is imp that privacy, no less no thanless companionship or professional assistance, is a that privacy, than companionship or profession socially conferred benefit. To privilege one these contexts would to socially conferred benefit. To of privilege one of be these contex ignore women's distinctive temperaments and priorities. Still, and the underignore women's distinctive temperaments priorities. St lying point of feminist separatist and standpoint theory remains: one lying point of feminist separatist and standpoint theo cannot quellquell the din of internalized oppression simplyoppression by logging offsimply cannot the din of internalized patriarchy.com and clicking women.com. Accessing one's own voice is patriarchy.com and on clicking on women.com. Accessing o aaskilled, ongoing, and relational skilled, ongoing, and undertaking. relational undertaking. Any tenable theorytheory of autonomy accommodate the realities of enAny tenable of must autonomy must accommodate the culturation and unconscious desire and must eschew the dubious ideal of I believe that styles of articulateness are raced and classed and that these stylistic differences lead many middle-class whites to discount the articulateness of members of other social groups. Thus, I would deny that feminist calls for hearing women's voices are elitist and exclusionary. If anything, they oblige members of privileged social groups to acquaint themselves with unfamiliar rhetorics and to learn to recognize different forms of articulateness (for a similar view, see Lorde 1984, 36-39). Perhaps the example of unheard articulateness that is best known to contemporary feminists is the "different voice"- the ethic of care- that Carol Gilligan 1982 discovered in girls' and women's moral discourse but that Lawrence Kohlberg had diagnosed as suboptimal moral development. Also, Uma Narayan 1997 analyzes the obstacles - e.g., ignorance of relevant history and a misguided view of culture - that impede Western feminists' ability to hear Indian feminist critiques of Indian institutions and practices and that consequently lead Western feminists to question the agency of Indian feminists. Margaret Walker recounts bell hooks's outrage at the unhearability of contemporary African- American self-narratives of moral virtue and goes on to analyze the sophisticated rhetorical strategies that Harriet Jacobs and other authors of slave narratives devised in order to render their moral integrity hearable (1998, 124-28). This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 744 I Meyers totalindividual individual control. view ofI have autonomy have adv total control. On the On viewthe of autonomy advanced,I the starting point issocially the socially self, isand the objec starting point is the situated, situated, divided self,divided and the object to gain rich understanding ofone what like what one aspires to aa rich understanding of what is likeone and is what oneand aspires to become, andtoto to adjust one's traits, desires, traits, values, affective and be be ableable to adjust one's desires, values, affective responses, andrelationships relationships one becomes dissatisfied with them. The aut and if oneif becomes dissatisfied with them. The autonomous individual isevolving an evolving subject-a subject whoofisher inlife charge o individual is an subject-a subject who is in charge within limits of imperfect introspective decipherability and within thethe limits of imperfect introspective decipherability and welcome, though some intrusive (or downright harmful), though in in some ways ways intrusive (or downright harmful), social relations; a social re subject who fashions her self-portrait andself-narrative shapes herthrough self-narrati subject who fashions her self-portrait and shapes her process of skillful self-discovery, self-definition, and self-dire aa process of skillful self-discovery, self-definition, and self-direction. Al- though pretending totranscended have transcended the an oppress though pretending to have the impact of an impact oppressiveof social regime is nothing a masculinist agentic regime is nothing but a but masculinist affectation,affectation, agentic skillfulness does skillfuln ensure that womnen's voices are not wholly by intern ensure that womnen's voices are not wholly subsumed by subsumed internalized ideol- ogy.Moreover, Moreover, the prospect of developing these skillstheir and expan ogy. the prospect of developing these skills and expanding range application holds out theofpromise of intrepid,esunpreced range ofof application holds out the promise intrepid, unprecedented saysinin womens self-determination. says womens self-determination. II. Women's testimony about motherhood decisions The discourse of reproductive freedom and choice notwithstanding, there is considerable controversy among feminist scholars about the extent of women's autonomy with respect to motherhood decisions.9 This disagreement is understandable, for autonomy of this sort can be difficult to detect. Many child-bearing decisions are collaborative decisions that bring into play the peculiar psychodynamics of particular couples and, in many cases, the power irnbalances that shadow heterosexual relationships as well. When heterosexual couples make these joint decisions, it is not unusual for the women to suspect that they are being unduly influenced by their partners and to feel that they are going along with plans and projects less out of conviction than out of habitual deference or a desire to minimize friction."' Yet, since the autonomous subject is neither insular nor static, " The feminist focus on reproductive rights, such as the right to an abortion, has prioritized self-direction - i.e., ensuring that women are free to do what they want - but neglected self-discovery and self-definition. I want to stress that nothing I shall say is meant to detract from the importance of self-direction and the rights that secure it. 1" For example, Anne Donchin cites a studv of couples belonging to RESOLVE, a support group for the infertile, that found that many of the men were less receptive to the idea of adoption than the lw omen and that the women were willing to undergo infertility procedures chiefly in order to please their male partners (1995, 49). It seems unlikely that women would assert their ow n v alues and preferences more forcefully in heterosexual discussions of whether or not to embark onl an attempt to have children. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 I 745 and individuals are equipped to copeto with changing and since sinceautonomous autonomous individuals are equipped cope with changi circumstances, finding oneself in a in new, possibly distressing, situationsituation can circumstances, finding oneself a new, possibly distressing, c crystallize one cares about mostmost deeply and what really to wants crystallizewhat what one cares about deeply andone what onewants really do. Donchin observes, somesome women who are notare aware havingof ha do. As AsAnne Anne Donchin observes, women who notofaware made decision - even, I would add, some whose pregmadeaaconscious conscious decision - even, I would add, women some women whose pr nancies to to contraceptive failure--might nevertheless "rejoice in nanciesare aredue due contraceptive failure--might nevertheless "rejoic their and affirm it asit their own" own" (Donchin 1996, 483).1 The theirpregnancy pregnancy and affirm as their (Donchin 1996, 483).1 T possibility retrospective autonomy compounds the difficulty of identi-of iden possibilityofof retrospective autonomy compounds the difficulty fying motherhood decisions (Meyers 1989, 54-55). fyingautonomous autonomous motherhood decisions (Meyers 1989, The 54-55). standard of of autonomy is prospective. An individual has an array standardpicture picture autonomy is prospective. An individual has an ar of after thoughtful consideration of each, one. How-one. How of options optionsand, and, after thoughtful consideration ofchooses each, chooses ever, can retrospectively realize that spontaneous, perhaps unever,since sinceone one can retrospectively realize that spontaneous, perhaps characteristic, behavior thatthat was was not thought out in out advance aptly ex-aptly characteristic, behavior not thought in advance pressed values andand sense of self, autonomy can be can conferred on past on pas pressedone's one's values sense of self, autonomy be conferred actions. must accommodate the dense texturetexture of human actions.Autonomy Autonomy must accommodate the dense oflives human lives the of of relationships, the need self-knowledge to keep pace the give-and-take give-and-take relationships, the for need for self-knowledge to keep with self, andand the the circuitous pathways to self-definition. Alwithan anevolving evolving self, circuitous pathways to self-definition though labyrinthine complexity may erode confidence in our ability toabilit thoughthis this labyrinthine complexity may erode confidence in our discriminate precise degrees of autonomy, it doesitnot follow we candiscriminate precise degrees of autonomy, does not that follow that we can not of of skillful self-determination to estimate approximate not use usethe thenotion notion skillful self-determination to estimate approximat levels or or to compare different individuals' autonomy.'2 levelsof ofautonomy autonomy to compare different individuals' autonomy.'2 Before however, a caveat is in is order. To make accurate BeforeI Iproceed, proceed, however, a caveat in order. Toan make an accur assessment any individual's autonomy, it is necessary to knowto far more far mo assessmentofof any individual's autonomy, it is necessary know about sheshe is in agentic skills skills and far more how she how sh abouthow howadept adept is using in using agentic and farabout more about did put them to use reaching her decision than thethan briefthe b did (or (ordid didnot) not) put them to in use in reaching her decision quotations interviews presented in theinempirical studies Istudies consulted quotationsfrom from interviews presented the empirical I consu usually Thus, mymy approach in this is to draw attention to usuallyreveal.'3 reveal.'3 Thus, approach in section this section is to draw attention t 1 discussion of becoming aware aware of an "implicit decision" decision" not to havenot to ha 1 Also Alsosee seeVeevers's Veevers's discussion of becoming of an "implicit children 23-25). children(1980, (1980, 23-25). 12 question of how one knows whether one is autonomous in Meyersin Meye 12 II discuss discussthe the question of how one knows whether one is autonomous 1989, 1989,87-91. 87-91. 13 is compounded by several additional featuresfeatures of the social scientific 13 This Thisdifficulty difficulty is compounded by several additional of the social literascientific lit ture topic. One problem is the of the social psychological literature litera ture on onthis this topic. One problem istendentiousness the tendentiousness of the social psychological on decisions. Researchers focus focus on "abnormal" phenomena -women who opt on motherhood motherhood decisions. Researchers on "abnormal" phenomena -women who out and, more recently, teenage mothers as well as pursuewho mothout of ofmotherhood motherhood and, more recently, teenage mothers aswomen well aswho women pursue m erhood technological means. Reports about the decision-making experiences of erhoodthrough through technological means. Reports about the decision-making experienc women choose to to have children and who pregnantpregnant are scarce.are Moreover, womenwho who choose have children andeasily who become easily become scarce. Moreov studies of women who choose not to have children and studies of women who resort to reproductive technologies in order to have children seem bent on proving either that these decisions are truly free, legitimate, and even admirable or else that these women are hapless victims. They seem to be in the grip of the polarization within autonomy theory that I criti- cized earlier. Also, work on adolescents is more concerned with how to prevent pregnancy or This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 746 I Meyers patterns in women's comments that show up across a number of and I shall argue that these patterns point to autonomy deficits curtailed use of agentic skills -in many women's decision m motherhood.14 While it would be wrong to claim that no w makes a fully autonomous reproductive decision - either to have or not to have them- the evidence of women's testimony sugges women who do are exceptional. A striking feature of much of the testimony is that it cluster around the pole of casualness or around the pole of adaman women regard having children as an inevitable part of life: "I can't remember if I ever thought I had a choice. I think I th you just did it. You grow up and you have children." ( 1993, 70) "When I was a child, I assumed I would have children. It wa those 'of course' kinds of things." (Lang 1991, 96) Such nonchalance seems to be the rule. Most people presume tha are necessary to personal fulfillment and never consider not hav dren (Veevers 1980, 40-41; Rogers and Larson 1988, 48). transmitted mythologies of rapturous motherhood subsidize thi fusal to reflect (Veevers 1980, 42).15 A study of women who become mothers found 70 percent of them "extraordinarily illu about what being a mother and caring for a child is actually lik which services are most beneficial to needy mothers than it is with these women making processes. The bureaucrat's managerial orientation displaces the value women's autonomy. Methodological debates over models of choice further picture. Some investigators are eager to demonstrate the influence of childho on identity consolidation and adult choice, while others seek to show that th of opportunities and constraints and the balance of likely rewards and penaltie woman faces overpower childhood socialization and determine reproductive o seeks to identirt or assess the skills women bring to bear on their decisions. empirical investigations cannot be taken at face value. In my study of these re I sought to compensate for these deficiencies by focusing mainly on the quo material and bv analyzing correspondences between narratives of "abnormal" experiences and the narratives of "normal" motherhood experiences I was abl is, perhaps, xworth adding that I take to heart the psychoanalytic insight th subjects provide invaluable insights into "normalitv." 14 Anticipating my discussion in Sees. IV and V, I shall briefly note some these patterns at the end of this section. 15 Also Barbara Omolade points out that ubiquitous cultural idealizations influence young, African-American women's procreative choices (1995, 274 reason to think this isn't true of w omen of other races and ages, as wvell. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 I 747 Lang1991, 1991, 82).16 Heedlessly imbibing valorizing p Lang 82).16 Heedlessly imbibing culturalcultural attitudes attitudes valorizing procre- ationtogether together with a romanticized image of motherhood removes m ation with a romanticized image of motherhood removes mother- hoodfrom from the realm of choice and preempts exercising agentic skil hood the realm of choice and preempts exercising agentic skills. Forsome some women, though, this casualness is an out-of-reach For women, though, this casualness is an out-of-reach luxury. Twoluxur groupsofof women express vehemently anti toward attitudes t groups women express vehemently pro andpro anti and attitudes childbearing. childbearing. Whenwomen women have difficulty conceiving, they often display a mo When have difficulty conceiving, they often display a monoma- niacaldedication dedication to infertility treatment and evince heartrendin niacal to infertility treatment and evince heartrending angst aboutthe the possibility of failure: about possibility of failure: "We'llsell sell the house if itto comes to it.was ... There "We'll the car,car, the the house even, even, if it comes it. ... There nothingI wouldn't I wouldn't if it meant we could have(Lasker a child." (Las nothing givegive up ifup it meant we could have a child." andBorg Borg 1994, and 1994, 11) 11) "Paindoesn't doesn't really explain is a hollow, empty of "Pain really explain it. It it. is a It hollow, empty feeling offeeling not beinggood good enough." (Ireland 37) being enough." (Ireland 1993, 1993, 37) Theflip flipside side automatic childbearing is obsession, anxiety, The of of automatic childbearing is obsession, anxiety, and despair.and It seems, seems, then, that assumption one will become a It then, that the the casualcasual assumption that onethat will become a mother masksa adesire desire that has rigid, the rigid, obdurate of a com masks that has the obdurate charactercharacter of a compulsion. Askedwhat what feared was ingrade, eighth one inte Asked sheshe feared mostmost when when she wasshe in eighth onegrade, interview subjectmentions mentions no threat her safety oropportunity to her opportunity subject no threat to hertosafety or to her to develop to d hertalents. talents. Rather, she recalls dreading "not being able to have chil her Rather, she recalls dreading "not being able to have children" (Ireland1993, 1993, 33).17 (Ireland 33).17 Still,there there a group of women do not the assumption Still, is is a group of women who dowho not share theshare assumption that childlessness implies defect and ensures dissatisfaction. These childlessness implies defect and ensures dissatisfaction. These women, whowomen havebeen been termed "early articulators," decidemotherhood against motherhood we have termed "early articulators," decide against well be- foremarriage marriage express intransigent opposition having childre fore andand express intransigent opposition to having to children: "I don't don'tfeel feel like having children] ever a decisi "I like thisthis [not [not having children] was everwas a decision.... It's just justnever never been an issue with me I'd ... say andI've I'dfelt saythis I'veway felt this w It's been an issue with me ... and sinceI Iwas was about twelve.' 1991, 79) since about twelve.' (Lang(Lang 1991, 79) "Evenasasa young a young child, I knew I would never have Ichildren. I "Even child, I knew I would never have children. just knewI Iwouldn't.... wouldn't.... I even my engagement second engagement b knew I even brokebroke up myup second becauseI Icould could he really wanted a family." (Lang cause seesee he really wanted a family." (Lang 1991, 76) 1991, 76) 16 16 AAconception conception of autonomy of autonomy from from medicalmedical ethics might ethics be might invoked be here. invoked In the cases here. inIn the which whichwomen women optopt for for motherhood motherhood while under whilethe under influence the influence of culturally of dispensed culturally idealizadispense tions tionsof ofmotherhood, motherhood, it might it might be argued be argued that they that havethey not given have informed not given consent informed to c motherhood. 17 It is perhaps worth emphasizing that what distressed this individual was the possibility that she might not be able to become pregnant and give birth, not the possibility that she might never have the opportunity to raise a child. Whereas the latter clearly is a way of realizing one's potential, it is doubtful that the former is. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 748 I Meyers Thistiny tiny minority of nonconformist women tha This minority of nonconformist women are certain thatare theycertain want nothing towith do with a child, andone that having one would w nothing to do having having a child, and that having would wreak havoc with their lives. The vast majority of women are absolutely sure that having a child is one of the most important things in life (and quite possibly the most important thing in life) and that not having a child would be devastating. What these typical women have in common with early articulators, though, is that a strong desire about childbearing is in place at an early age. The early formation of these desires would pose no obstacle to autonomy if women used their agentic skills later to consider whether to act on these desires. But most women experience desires about motherhood as psychic postulates that govern the course of their adult life. Thus, desires about motherhood are generally formed well before women are equipped to make autonomous decisions, and, implacable as these desires are, they are subsequently insulated from open-minded reflection and modification. Most women seem impelled into or away from maternity; however, there is a group of voluntarily childless women who do not fit this profile. This second group, which is about twice the size of the early articulator group, has been dubbed the "postponers." Ambivalence and indecision mark the postponers' relation to maternity: "I fear I wouldn't be a fulfilled woman, that I'll wake up at fifty and say 'You blew it.' But I go through entire days thinking of what I'm able to do because I don't have children." (Safer 1996, 57) "I really want to want children.... I keep hoping that, when the time comes for me to have a family, I'll just automatically get ready ... I really hope I will be a happy mother someday ... because it's so much of a hassle to make a decision not to have the family." (Gerson 1985, 133) "I think I was waiting to really want to do it [have children].... Really, I was waiting for the desire to make the decision for me, I guess. But it didn't. I don't not want to have children.... It has started to look as though not making the decision to have kids was the same as making the decision not to." (Lang 1991, 85) "Am I feeling bad because it's something I really wanted and don't have?; or Is it feeling bad because it is something other people have and I always have to say I don't? I just don't know." (Ireland 1993, 65) This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 I 749 "Sometimes I feelI like I was gypped, though I even wasn't though gypped. I wasn't gyppe "Sometimes feel like I waseven gypped, It mymy own own choice,choice, but I feel, whyI did I choose this? made this? What made Itwas was but feel, why didWhat I choose me not to have when I really in my Iheart wantin to my heart want mechoose choose not tochildren have children when really have children? ... How...did this happen?" (Gerson 1985, 143-44) have children? How did this happen?" (Gerson 1985, 143-44) The reasonreason postponers give for forgoing is the childbearing value Theprincipal principal postponers give childbearing for forgoing is the v they place on self-determination (Houseknecht(Houseknecht 1987, 377; Landa 1990, they place on self-determination 1987, 377; Landa 148; 1996,1996, 104). Yet, terms liketerms "drift," like "passivity," and "uncon148;Safer Safer 104). Yet, "drift," "passivity," and "u scious" recur in analyses of these women's choices, and these quotationsand these quot scious" recur in analyses of these women's choices, lend to these (Gerson 1985, 135; Lang 1991, lendsupport support to characterizations these characterizations (Gerson 1985, 135; Lang 1 73; 1993,1993, 42). Unable acknowledge their doubts about mother73;Ireland Ireland 42). to Unable to acknowledge their doubts about mo hood or or unable to figure out how to reconcile with motherhood their hood unable to figure out how motherhood to reconcile with other aims, postponers tell themselves that motherhood will motherhood eventually other aims, postponers tell themselves that will even happen. ButBut it doesn't, and manyand of them are left feeling confused happen. it doesn't, many of them are leftand feeling confuse sometimes regretful. Spared the inexorable that propel most that propel m sometimes regretful. Spared thedesires inexorable desires women to become mothers and some women to avoid motherhood assid- uously, postponers end up in limbo, unable or unwilling to use their agentic skills to sort out their values and desires and hence unable to final- ize their decision. Bewilderment is no less inimical to autonomy than compulsion. Now, it might seem that I have not given postponers enough credit. Perhaps they are not deluding themselves into thinking that they are merely delaying motherhood. Perhaps they are clearheadedly postponing making a decision about motherhood- keeping their options open until they are sure what they really want to do. Perhaps they are cleverly outfoxing norms linking femininity and motherhood by representing themselves as postponers rather than refusers. It is possible that complete interview transcripts would disclose such complex motivations. However, to judge by these excerpts, neither of these readings is likely to be substantiated. These women speak of wanting to want children, hoping a desire for children will overtake them, and feeling cheated because they really want to have children but never did. If these women are transgressing gender norms, they evidently cannot admit it. Nor do they lay claim to a strategy of autonomous delay. Some of them speak of the desire for motherhood as something that may eventually happen to them and make the decision for them. If these women are mobilizing their agentic skills and taking charge of this issue, they are keeping it a secret. If being able to tell one's own story in one's own voice is a mark of self-determination, these women's autonomy is suspect. However, other postponers speak of seemingly irresolvable conflicts within their value This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 750 I Meyers systems and between nonmaternal and social Alexpecta systems and between their their nonmaternal status and status social expectations. though though these these women women are now aredeeply now divided, deeply it divided, is altogether it ispossible altogether that pos they theywill will apply apply their their agentic agentic skills toskills these conflicts to theseand conflicts eventually and reach eventual an autonomous decision. A study of teen mothers opens another window on women's shaky grip on autonomy vTis-a-vis motherhood. None of the subjects of this study said she intended to become pregnant (Horowitz 1995, 153). But as their pregnancies progressed, all of them eventually said they intended to become mothers (Horowitz 1995, 155). If Horowitz's analysis is reliable, however, there is no reason to regard their professed intentions as autono- mous.'8 Neither abortion nor adoption were considered serious options (Horowitz 1995, 153). Moreover, the pregnant women "were instructed by peers and mothers that they were expected to 'intend' to become moth- ers" (Horowitz 1995, 153; emphasis added). Since social norms foreclosed the only ways to refuse motherhood, and since the people closest to them prodded them to embrace motherhood, it appears that these women were immersed in a social milieu that provided little or no support for skillful self-interrogation and individualized decision making. Thus, their commitments to motherhood seem more like socially engineered default positions than autonomous choices. While the nwomen Horowitz studies are subjected to a veritable deluge of blatant promaternal pressure, there are less overt, more universal social pressures that parallel the ones these young women face. In the United States today, having children promises to solve two perennial human prob- lems, namely, meaninglessness and loneliness. For the countless people who find their jobs neither interesting nor fulfilling, children represent a wav to infuse value and significance into their everyday life (Omolade 1995, 279). Also, since society is splintered into family units, and since social interaction is organized around family life in many communities, children xward off isolation. Of course, meeting the needs for meaning and companionship is extremely important and, in principle, entirely compatible with autonomy. The threat to autonomy stems from the fact that many people have little choice about how to meet them.19 In view of the fact that 18 Unfortunatclh, Horowitz does not quote extensively from her intervieews with her subjects, and so wne cannot hear their stories in their voices. 19 Arlie Hochschild 1997 documents the extent to which employers have transformed workplaces into employee-friendly sites where workers feel more fulfilled and appreciated than ther do at home and enjov their interpersonal relationships more than they enjoy their spouses and children. The net result, she claims, is that workers are increasing time spent at wxork and socializing writh coworkers, wxhile minimizing time spent with their families. It is not clear howx this trend w ill play out. To date, people still overxwhelmingly choose to have This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 1 751 social structures make having children the only feasible way for m people to satisfy these needs, it is reasonable for them to opt for paren hood. Still, if most people found their work more worthwhile and f it easier to maintain deep, long-term friendships apart from parent-ch networks, there would be more reason to think women were cho motherhood for its intrinsic value and special rewards and less reaso consider their autonomy with respect to motherhood at risk. Whether because imperious desires about motherhood exert a see ingly despotic power over women's lives, because women's feelings motherhood are so opaque or so conflicted that they can't figure out w they want, or because social expectations, personal privations, or cul myths stifle women's self-reflection, autonomy is elusive.20 There are ex tions, of course. To become mothers, lesbians who have not had chil in a heterosexual relationship must overcome formidable obstacles- cultural stereotype that excludes them from maternity as well as the r tance of adoption agencies and reproductive technology clinics to assisti them. Thus, lesbians cannot avoid making a conscious choice, and the evidence that they often carefully consider their choices - that they ex ine their motives for having children and that they think through the plans for raising their children before they become parents (Weston 19 190-91). Still, such sober, in-depth reflection is neither universal in lesbian community nor is it confined to this group. In a rich and ca autobiographical narrative, Jeanne Safer, a married heterosexual, relate lengthy and complex reflective process through which she decided again becoming a mother (1996, 7-42). Safer's attunement to her feelings, honesty about her needs and goals, her lucid and affectionate interpret of her relationship to her parents, and her efforts to gain a realistic gr of what mothering would be like argue for the autonomy of her choice the same vein, describing the conclusion of her decision process, on children but cram parent-child relationships into designated "quality" time slots. In the run, the shift in the balance of incentives might lead more people to reject parenthood it might spark a critique of the demands of the workplace and a movement to reduce the t and energy invested there. Hochschild advocates the latter outcome. 20 Rogers and Larson cite a study in which 92 percent of the voluntarily childless co affirmed that they made an active choice and nearly 63 percent of the childed couples affi that they made an active choice (1988, 50). I think the best explanation of the app conflict between these self-reports and my interpretation of the evidence I have presen that what these respondents mean by an "active choice" does not coincide with any plau understanding of an autonomous choice. It is also worth noting that the subjects in this were couples. Consequently, it is not clear what the women would have said apart f their partners. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 752 I Meyers Mardy Ireland's childfree offers aglimpse tantalizing glimpse o Mardy Ireland's childfree subjects subjects offers a tantalizing of the satis- faction faction autonomy autonomy brings: brings: "The knowing "The knowing started as a started kind of intellectual as a kind of acceptance, then it down sankinto down into with my emotional heart with emotional acceptance, then it sank my heart acceptance, and andfinally finally came came downdown into my into belly.... myThe belly.... deep knowing The deep is a great knowing reis lief" lief"(Ireland (Ireland 1993, 1993, 81). 81). These autonomous lesbians and their heterosexual counter These autonomous lesbians and their heterosexual counterparts are hardly typical, however. When asked whyorthey don't w hardly typical, however. When asked why they want don't want want toor have children, children, most most people people are flummoxed. are flummoxed. Highly articulate Highly individuals articulate lose indiv theirfluency, fluency, grope for and words, and stumble around, seizing on their grope for words, stumble around, seizing on incompat- ibleexplanations explanations and multiplying justifications ible and multiplying justifications (Veevers 1980,(Veevers 15; Lasker 1980 and andBorg Borg 1994, 1994, 14-15).21 14-15).21 Overt defensiveness Overt defensiveness about motherhood about is also motherh common. Mothers and childfree women their common. Mothers and childfree women alike glorifyalike their glorify own choices andscorn scorn other choices1980, (Veevers 1980, 122; Ger and thethe other group'sgroup's choices (Veevers 122; Gerson 1985, 190;Horowitz Horowitz 153). If anything, such awkwardness in 190; 1995,1995, 153). If anything, such awkwardness in accounting foroneself oneself testiness about one's chosen course bespeak for and and testiness about one's chosen course bespeak autonomy deficits. If women were autonomously becoming mothers deficits. If women were autonomously becoming mothers or declining to, or dec wewould would expect to ahear a splendid chorus ofconfident distinctive, we expect to hear splendid chorus of distinctive, voices, confid but butinstead instead we are we hearing are hearing a shrill cacophony a shrill cacophony of trite tunes.of trite tunes. III. The scope of autonomous choice and motherhood That decisions about motherhood combine mind-boggling complexity with daunting momentousness militates against supposing that these deci- sions can ever be autonomous. Unconscious forces are opaque and indecipherable yet, for all one knows, decisive. Darwinian mandates seem to hold sway, yet the relation between genetic coding, on the one hand, and sub- jectivity and desire, on the other, seems unfathomable. Likewise, disen- tangling one's own desires and values from internalized social ideology seems vital, yet any boundary demarcated between them seems artificial and arbitrary. Disquieting, too, is the fact that choosing to become a mother is irrevocable, although no one can accurately anticipate and fully appreciate the consequences of this choice.22 The possibility of autono21 Susan Babbitt's discussion of autonomy and nonpropositional knowledge is relevant here (1997, 374-76). People sometimes have intuitions, feelings, urges, and the like that signal their true values, needs, and desires but that cannot be articulated in any authoritative discourse. To gain autonomy, according to Babbitt, individuals must find concepts and language that give voice to this inexpressible self-knowledge. In Sec. IV, I critique a discursive framework that mystifies women's desires about motherhood and that reduces women to inarticulateness when asked about their desires, and I propose some specific remedies. 22 Choosing not to become a mother leaves one more latitude for reconsideration. Even if one opts for irreversible tubal ligation, one could still adopt a child. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 I 753 mously deciding whether or not to become a mother might be reje then, because reproduction is assumed to be biologically programmed, cause being a mother is considered an incontrovertible value, becau lifelong ramifications of the decision seem to be beyond individual pow of comprehension, or because the individual is thought to be too meshed in her social context or too driven by her unconscious motives be self-determining. Nevertheless, I shall argue that autonomy with re to motherhood is both possible and desirable. Settled, virtually indisputable values preempt autonomy. That is for many people "To be, or not to be?" does not seem like a reason question to pose every morning before breakfast. Now, it might thought that people can and should autonomously judge whether l worthwhile. But once one has made this determination and incorpo it into one's autonomously validated value system, it need not be recon ered and reaffirmed unless reasons to doubt its wisdom come to light. account is unconvincing, though, for under reasonably propitious c tions reaching the conclusion that life is worth living is all but inevita Moreover, any reasons one might adduce to support it pale in comparis to the brute inexorability of the life urge and the sheer obviousness o desirability of living. It is hard, then, to see what makes this conv autonomous, and going through the motions of rationally endorsin is fatuous, if not pathological. Where there is only one real option and no genuine choice, the no autonomy. It is just as well, I would add, that people usually ar capable of deciding that life is not worth living, for, if they could, so would surely make disastrous mistakes. Yet, when life goes tragi awry, people are obliged to weigh the value of life. Terrible personal m fortune-severe, unrelievable suffering or debilitating, fatal illness social cataclysm - genocide or the rise of a totalitarian leader - call the perordinate value of continued existence into question. Under these cumstances, there is nothing absurd about renewing or repudiating commitment to life, and it is crucial for autonomy to get a purch this issue. My comments about autonomy and the value of life bear on the auto omy of women's decisions about whether or not to become mothe several respects. First, if women's autonomy with respect to mothe decisions is superfluous, it must be shown that being a mother is an in trovertible value comparable to life itself. I shall take up this quest more detail shortly, but let me suggest at this point that elevating mo hood to this status would amount to reinstating the doctrine that mot hood is women's destiny. Second, that people can and sometim This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 754 I Meyers autonomously make life and death decisions shows that neither the mo- mentousness nor the irreversibility of a decision entails that it cannot be made autonomously. Whatever the obstacles to autonomously making such life-defining decisions may be, then, they are not insuperable. How- ever, third, if the superfluousness of autonomy over continuing to live stems in part from a biologically programmed drive to survive, it might seem that women's autonomy over motherhood decisions must be superfluous, too. If instinctual (or biologically programmed) behavior lies outside the scope of autonomy, and if there is a procreative instinct, autonomy over motherhood decisions is ruled out. Although I am not sure exactly what instinctual behavior is or which behavior qualifies as instinctual, I am confident that some behavior that many people would consider instinctual can be autonomous. For example, copulation and other erotically pleasurable behavior is widely regarded as instinctual, and yet celibacy is an ascetic spiritual discipline that has a long and transcultural history. Likewise, most cultures prescribe sexual conti- nence, if not total abstinence, for unwed women. Admittedly, there is much to be said against these practices of deprivation and these norms of chastity-they are unhealthy, they are unfair to women, and so forth. My point is not to endorse them. Rather, my point is that, despite the fact that the drive for sexual gratification seems likely to count as instinctual, these practices and norms presuppose that sexual desire is amenable to autonomous regulation. Agentic skills can override instinct. Still, sexuality is a fascinating case. Although sexuality seems inextricable from our biological makeup, there is good reason to suppose that in many respects it is socially constructed, and yet people experience it, by and large, as a given. Few ever question the desirability of sexual satisfaction. Few see switching sexual orientation as feasible. Even the content of erotic fantasy has an obsessional, intractable character. For most people the arena of autonomy with respect to sexuality is sharply circumscribed. However, it is doubtful that we should be complacent about this limitation. Sandra Bartky's discussion of women's masochistic sexual fantasies highlights a troubling dimension of this pervasive sexual heteronomy. Bartky describes the predicament of P., a feminist who is beset by masochistic sexual fantasies (1990, 46). According to P.'s feminist analysis, such fantasies eroticize male dominance and thus help to perpetuate oppressive gen- der relations. Yet, P.'s sexual pleasure depends on conjuring up images of being violated and humiliated. Her principles at odds with her desire, P. is estranged from herself. But her desire remains invested in these fantasies despite moral suasion and psychotherapy. As Bartky observes, feminism This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 I 755 lacks "an effective political practice around issues of personal transfor tion," and consequently women are not in a position to "decolonize" own imaginations (1990, 61). Lamentably, P. cannot achieve autono control over her erotic imagination. Biological dispositions do not necessarily preclude autonomy. S strictures can thwart autonomy. The issue is not nature versus culture issue is malign compulsion, such as P.'s patriarchally induced masoc fantasies, versus benign desire, such as one's sexual orientation. It is clear that having children is not a malign compulsion. Alth some feminists trace women's subordination to childbearing and/or rearing and urge women to eschew motherhood, the vast majority of nists regard motherhood as compatible in principle with feminist and focus on critiquing social attitudes and policies that devalue and pe ize women's reproductive activities. I agree that there is no inherent c flict between feminist aims and motherhood. There is, however, a man conflict between feminism and the pronatalist dogma that motherhoo necessary to fulfillment as a woman, and there are numerous reaso consider women's gaining autonomous control over motherhood sions a prime feminist objective. First, if individuals are unique, and if their personalities and talents enormously diverse, having children cannot be the best route, or e viable route, to personal fulfillment for every woman. For some w motherhood proves to be a persistent source of frustration and anguis well as a lifelong distraction from more compelling interests and goals Second, motherhood continues to disadvantage women economic Adolescents who bear children and assume responsibility for raising th have difficulty completing their education and finding decently remu ated work. The 1996 gutting of the federal Aid to Families with D dent Children (AFDC) program in the United States has increased economic peril of solo mothers exponentially. Moreover, mothers who with male partners and who do not work outside the home are vulnera to impoverishment in the aftermath of separation or divorce. Yet, wor outside the home does not adequately protect mothers from this h for they often find career advancement stalled. Since mothers serve as mary caregivers in most families, they are obliged to take time off to their children's needs or to fill in when paid child-care arrangements through. In addition, their "leisure" time is typically consumed by hom making tasks - cooking, cleaning, and, of course, caring for the childr Job performance and hence salary increments are often casualties of t physically and emotionally grueling domestic regimen. Despite exp This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 756 I Meyers paternal participation in care child some social and despi paternal participation in child in care some in social sectors and sectors despite some employers' parent-accommodating programs, suchdaycare as on-site employers' parent-accommodating programs, such as on-site and day flextime, economic of motherhood remain Feminists substantial. Fe flextime, thethe economic costs costs of motherhood remain substantial. shouldcontinue continue to campaign theseinflicted socially inflicted lia should to campaign againstagainst these socially liabilities. However, since these and the of specter ofare poverty However, since these costs costs and the specter poverty unlikely are to beunlik eliminated forseeable feminists also be c eliminated in in thethe forseeable future,future, feminists should alsoshould be concerned withensuring ensuring women are make autonomous decisio with thatthat women are able to able make to autonomous decisions about whether they want to become mothers at all. whether they want to become mothers at all. Now,itit might seem onceinjustices these injustices have been Now, might seem that that once these have been overcome - ifovercom society fulfilled its obligation to support children and if communa society fulfilled its obligation to support children and if communal child- rearing practices in place--autonomy with respect to rearing practices werewere in place--autonomy with respect to becoming a bec mother would cease of paramount importance. my view, h mother would cease to beto of be paramount importance. In my view,In however, autonomy would on a different quite different complexion, while autonomy would taketake on a quite complexion, while remaining as rema important as ever. as many are now important as ever. JustJust as many women women are now using their using agentictheir skills agent to negotiate negotiate autonomously of coparenting scheme to autonomously variousvarious kinds ofkinds coparenting schemes, women in aapostpatriarchal postpatriarchal society to agentic use their agentic skills t in society would would need to need use their skills to autono- mously create sustain child-rearing communities. Likewise mously create andand sustain child-rearing communities. Likewise, just as women who their prospective coparents to do th women who cancan nownow trusttrust their prospective coparents to do their share andwhose whose economic advantages worries and economic advantages relieve relieve them of them worriesof about payingabout a child'sexpenses expenses concentrate on the intrinsic values aof bringing child's can can concentrate on the intrinsic values of bringing child intothe the world the personal meanings that giving birth and the into world and and the personal meanings that giving birth and the ensuing mother-child relationship have for her, so too in a postpat mother-child relationship have for her, so too women in awomen postpatriarchal society could nuts-and-bolts exigencies and attention focus their att society could set set asideaside nuts-and-bolts exigencies and focus their on core core issues of value and meaning. I would expect conv on issues of value and meaning. I would also expectalso conversations aboutthe the meanings a child new would child have would for the parental par about meanings a new for have the parental partnership or for forthe the child-rearing community to be for many women. or child-rearing community to be salient forsalient many women. If moth- erswere were longer assigned sole responsibility forand child care and d ers nono longer assigned sole responsibility for child care devalued forthis this work, their autonomous making would undoub for work, their autonomous decisiondecision making would undoubtedly assume a more relational mode. Still, it does not follow that women should relinquish their autonomy and submit to a partner's or a group's wishes. On the contrary, for the same reasons that postpatriarchal societies should guarantee women's right to abortion, it would remain desirable for women to marshal their agentic skills when participating in deliberations about becoming mothers. Moreover, we must not forget that some women will not want to have children or join child-rearing collectives under any circumstances. Their interests deserve equal respect, and their interests confirm the need for feminists to regard women's autonomy over motherhood decisions as a prime and ineliminable concern. Third, becoming a mother can pose a threat to women's health. Pregnancy and birth are not without danger. Mortality rates for abortion in the This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 757 United States are considerably lower than for giving birth.23 Mo still, by playing on infertile women's feelings of inadequacy the predatory reproductive technology industry peddles painful expensive treatments that are frequently ineffective. Lack o makes women easy targets for these blandishments. In additi evidence that child care can be instrumental in the onset of psy disorders, such as depression (Oakley 1981, 80). Plainly, child child rearing can be detrimental to the well-being of individ Again, to the extent that better health policy could ameliorate t feminists should be advocating appropriate reforms. But neit feminists neglect women's need for autonomy over motherhood Along with these personal considerations, childbearing rais social morality. On the one hand, fascist racism and militaris ideologically on pronatalism. "Our" women's alleged duty to bear not only offsets high birthrates among "inferior" peoples, it fil of the infantry. Thus, the xenophobic French politician, Jea Pen, has recently reminded "French" women--in his parlance gory excludes French women of Jewish or African descent -of t to procreate. On the other hand, despite recent worldwide drops rates, overpopulation, when properly extricated from racist und remains a serious problem. Although famines have been cause able distributional bottlenecks as opposed to unavoidable sup ages, and although we have the agricultural and industrial sustain many more people than presently exist (Sen 1990), po crowding are not negligible problems, and it is doubtful that we on technological advances to solve them. To condemn the cruelty cive restraints on procreation is not to absolve individuals of the bility to confront the ecological and social consequences of child-bearing decisions. Motherhood is by no means a malign compulsion, for there of good reasons why a woman might want to have children. But motherhood simply a benign desire that should be accepted with tion. Since there are both prudential and social reasons to qu desirability of becoming a mother, maternity is not an incon universal value. Moreover, even if most women are biological to want to have children, we have seen that it does not follow th mous choice is impossible. Since there is ample evidence that 23 For maternal mortality rates, see "Vital and Health Statistics," June 199 partment of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Di and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics). This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 758 I Meyers make fully autonomous decisions about whether or not to become moth- or not to bec make fully autonomous decisions about whether ers, andand since since there arethere compelling for women reasons to gain autonomous ers, arereasons compelling for women to gain a control control over over these decisions, these it decisions, is puzzling that it feminists is puzzling have given that littlefeminists have g attention to theorizing how motherhood could be brought within the be brought attention to theorizing how motherhood could scope of autonomous reflection and action.24 In my judgment, it is in-In my judgmen scope of autonomous reflection and action.24 cumbent on feminists to contest the conditions thatsocial prevent conditions so cumbent on feminists tosocial contest the that p many many women women from making from fully making autonomous fully decisions autonomous about becoming decisions about mothers. IV. Pronatalist discourse-matrigyno-idolatry Plainly, I cannot address all of the issues that the problem of autonomy and motherhood raises here. What I propose to do is to revisit the theme of voice and self-determination and to focus my remaining remarks on the ways in which culturally entrenched tropes and images that bond womanhood to motherhood usurp women's voices and endanger their autonomy. What is so pernicious about pronatalist discourse, in my view, is that it defeats autonomy by harnessing highly directive enculturation to unconscious processes that are codified and consecrated in a standard-issue selfportrait and self-narrative. In pursuing this line of thought, I shall rely on work in psychoanalytic theory to link the cultural context to the individual psyche and decision-making capacities, and I shall urge that a feminist ac- count of autonomy and a proautonomy feminist agenda must be concerned with women's capacity to contend with the pronatalist figurative regime. The discursive setting of women's decisions about motherhood is over- whelmingly pronatalist. Heterosexuality is not only normative, it is imbued with a procreation imperative. Freud's narrative of the emergence of femininity is simultaneously the story of the woman's erotic attraction to 24 For a review of the neglect of this topic in early second-wave feminist writing, see Gi- menez 1984, 287-301. For an example of a feminist attempt to theorize childbirth as a model of human agency, see Held 1989. Perhaps pragmatic concerns have led to the neglect of this topic. Feminists might reasonably fear that accenting the option of forgoing motherhood would alienate the huge population of women who regard motherhood as a prime value and a core project. Also, if one believes that securing the interests of mothers is the more pressing objective, one might worry that emphasizing women's free choice in regard to becoming mothers could supply ammunition to opponents of policies and services beneficial to women who already are mothers. There is certainly reason to fear that opponents of feminist initia- tives would sidestep the issue by counseling women to exercise their right not to have children if they expect to find motherhood onerous. Theoretical objections to autonomy have undoubtedly played a role as well. As I noted in Sec. I, a number of feminists have urged that the autonomous individual is nothing but an androcentric phantasm. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 I 759 men and the story of her desire to bear children.25 Diverse religiou tions mandate procreative heterosexuality by condemning "barre riages. Moreover, they figure the woman as the mother. Marian im for example, powerfully identifies womanhood with motherhood an resents the mother as a beatific, munificent dispenser of love and f ness. The doctrine of "true womanhood," which declares childbe be women's destiny, and the "cult of domesticity," which elabor destiny into a child-rearing function, have deep roots in the balefu of reproductive politics in the United States (Petchesky 1985, 74 1988, 135-61).26 This "heritage" is regularly refurbished and re for image consumers. Popular media, such as magazines, televisi movies, fortify the pronatalist juggernaut by depicting motherhood only creditable form of fulfillment for women (Franzwa 1974; Peck Kaplan 1994, 258-67). Ever resilient, matrigyno-idolatry flouris spite (maybe, because of) women's political and economic advances adaptable, matrigynist figurations proliferate to beguile a changing ence. As one interview subject comments, "I think the only rea considering having children right now is because it's heresy not sider having children" (Gerson 1985, 164; emphasis added). She whereof she speaks. Regrettably, feminists have sometimes colluded in matrigyno-ido Margaret Sanger famously proclaimed, "Woman must have her freed the fundamental freedom of choosing whether or not she will be a and how many children she will have" (Petchesky 1985, 89). Yet, acceptance for contraception, Sanger capitulated to her medical partners who took the position that doctors should have the exclusiv to dispense birth control and that dispensation should be limited in which pregnancy would be harmful to the woman's health (Pe 1985, 90). Contemporary feminists have proven no more sensitiv dangers of pronatalist discourse. Possibly the most blatant ins "feminist" matrigynism is Luce Irigaray's stunning declaration: "It i sary for us to discover and assert that we are always mothers once 25 Curiously, few feminist psychoanalytic revisionists sever this link. 26 For an insightful discussion of how these gender dogmas infect the U.S. jud cess, see Wendy Williams's analysis of Supreme Court rulings bearing on women's r military, especially the combat exclusion (1997, 698-700). 27 adopt the expression "matrigyno-idolatry" rather than relying on the more expression "pronatalist discourse" because I want my language to convey the f points: (1) the fact that cultures systematically bond womanhood to motherhood i ideal; (2) the reverence this ideal inspires; and (3) the utter misguidedness -ind downright sinisterness - of this reverence. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 760 I Meyers women" (Irigaray 1991, 43). More subtle but no less egregious m nist formulations can be found in other current feminist scholars Negative stereotypes of childfree women match and buttress ide matrigynist figurations.28 Through the figure of the witch who c with the forces of evil, the childless woman is portrayed as an out her freedom and vitality are branded wicked. In psychoanalyti ology, the witch represents the woman with a "masculinity comple selfish, hard-driving career woman, lately vilified as the "corporat ball-breaker." Defanged, the witch becomes the more ambiguous fi the spinster. As the spinster, the childless woman is portrayed as for she has achieved neither of the defining feminine goals, name riage and motherhood. Yet, she seems more pathetic than odi row, rigid, and dry, to be sure, but effectively neutralized in her isolation. While the spinster issues an unmistakable warning to young women - see how dreadful it is to miss your chance for pro heterosexual bliss-she is as much an object of pity as contempt. It is noteworthy, as well, that the feminist social psychological lit on child-bearing choices has not expunged this enmity toward women. Veevers's influential analysis of her data on voluntary chil polarizes her childfree subjects into two categories and implicitly v one of them (Veevers 1980, 158-59). On the one hand, there a life-negating "rejectors" - those narcissistic, child-hating antiparen faults are memorialized in the stereotype. On the other hand, ther life-affirming "afficionados" who are so enthralled with other pro they haven't had children, but who are flexible and might have ch their circumstances changed. Most childfree individuals, Veevers a afficionados, and afficionados are "more similar to parents'. Veevers thinks she is doing the childfree population a service by d the myth that they are all sour, maladjusted misanthropes. But in as she legitimates voluntary childlessness by assimilating it to the ogy of parenthood, she contributes to a retrograde current of nor matrigynist sentiment. Motherhood is the sine qua non of wom and even childfree women (the healthy ones, at any rate) are m heart. Feminist psychoanalysts argue that the key figurative culp matrigyno-idolatry-the trope that undergirds the familiar im ventoried so far and the trope that ultimately carries the weight 28 It is worth noting how jarring the term childfree still is, for it testifies to the int of the cultural refusal to acknowledge that not having children is a legitimate an individuals, a positive option. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 I 761 facturing the "choice" of maternitythe image of mother-child f facturing the "choice" of maternityis the image of is mother-child fusion (Kristeva Bassin 1994, scientized 163). Recently (Kristeva 1987,1987, 234-36;234-36; Bassin 1994, 163). Recently and ver- scientized an nacularized the sonography-facilitated trope of mother-fetus bon nacularized in theinsonography-facilitated trope of mother-fetus bonding, this emotionally galvanizing, an original state of this emotionally galvanizing, signal trope signal posits an trope original posits state of unfail- ingsuccor, succor, harmony, andThe security. babycentric tendencies of ps ing harmony, and security. babycentricThe tendencies of psychoan- alytic theory itnarrating towardthe narrating the tasks of separation, individ alytic theory bias itbias toward tasks of separation, individuation, andagency agency that this union original union poses for the child. L and that this original poses for the developing child. Let developing us reverse perspective thisfrom trope, instead, from the sta reverse our our perspective and look atand this look trope, at instead, the standpoint ofwomen. women. To them, this ubiquitous trope represents of To them, this ubiquitous trope represents pregnancy and infant pregnancy and care a utopia and, moreover, a utopia in which the mother is all-p care as as a utopia and, moreover, a utopia in which the mother is all-powerful andperfectly perfectly beneficent. Biology bestows this unsurpassable possibi and beneficent. Biology bestows this unsurpassable possibility on women withholds it from What temptation! Is it any women andand withholds it from men. What a men. temptation! Is itaany wonder that historically subordinated, devalued seize that historically subordinated, devalued women seize the women opportunity to the opportu become mothers? it any thatembark manyonof them embark on m become mothers? Is it anyIswonder thatwonder many of them mother- hood with drastically of Is being mother? Is it any w hood with drastically unrealisticunrealistic ideas of being ideas a mother? it any a wonder that they lot ofarticulating trouble plausible articulating plausible reasons f that they have have a lot ofa trouble reasons for their choice? fusion forecloses autonomy choice? TheThe siren siren song of song fusion of forecloses autonomy and marshals antago- and marshals a nism idea that with autonomy respect nism to to the the very very idea that autonomy respect to with motherhood mightto motherhoo bea a good thing.29 be good thing.29 Feminists not beentoimmune toofthe Feminists have have not been immune the influence thisinfluence trope either. of this trope eit Inher her account the reproduction for example, Nanc In account of the of reproduction of mothering, of for mothering, example, Nancy Cho- dorow comes alarmingly close to this resurrecting this psyfantasy as femini dorow comes alarmingly close to resurrecting fantasy as feminine chic structure to condoning resulting usurpation of w chic structure and to and condoning the resulting the usurpation of women's autonomy. Endowed with aself relational self that has "permeable ego bo autonomy. Endowed with a relational that has "permeable ego bound- aries," women mothers notthey only because they are emot aries," women becomebecome mothers not only because are emotionally equipped and to findbut it also satisfying but equipped to doto it do wellit andwell to find it satisfying because they longalso because they torecreate recreate the experience of being mothered to the experience of being mothered and to reexperienceand that to un- reexperience th mediated interpersonal bond 1978, (Chodorow 1978, 206-9).30 Yet, as mediated interpersonal bond (Chodorow 206-9).30 Yet, as Donna Bassin cautions, surrender toofthe allure of the trope Bassin cautions, surrender to the allure the trope of fusion comes at an of fusion comes exorbitant, or rather, ruinous, price: is "If motherhood exorbitant, or rather, a ruinous,aprice: "If motherhood taken on for nos- is taken on f talgic reasons, . the can mother can experience only as an talgic reasons, . . the .mother experience herself only as an herself object" (1994, 172).31 (1994, 172).31 29 29For For an illuminating an illuminating discussiondiscussion of the linkageof between the fusion linkage imagery between and motherhood fusion imagery and mot in inthe the mind mind of a maternally of a maternally inclined woman inclined and the woman linkage between and the motherhood linkage and between disinmotherhood a tegration tegration imagery imagery in the mind in the of a maternally mind ofdisinclined a maternally woman, see disinclined Marianne Hirsch's woman, see Mariann reading of Toni Morrison's Sula (1989, 182-85). reading of Toni Morrison's Sula (1989, 182-85). 30 30But But forfor her reservations her reservations about nonautonomous about nonautonomous motherhood, see Chodorow motherhood, 1974, 60. see Chodorow 19 31 31There There is anisextensive an extensive literature on literature the psychological on the perils, psychological both for the developing perils, both for the dev child child andand for the formother, the mother, associated with associated the trope with of fusion. the In trope addition of to Bassin fusion. 1994,In addition to Bas see seeChodorow Chodorow 1980; Chodorow 1980; Chodorow and Contratto and 1982;Contratto Benjamin 1994; 1982; and ChasseguetBenjamin 1994; and Cha Smirgel 1994. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 762 I Meyers Patriarchal cultures immerse women in a sophisticated system of matriPatriarchal cultures immerse women in a sophisticated system gynist figurations. This discourse singles out women's preferred course and gynist figurations. This discourse singles out women's preferred trumpets its its attractions; it conceals the drawbacks of embarking of on embark this trumpets attractions; it conceals the drawbacks course and quells apprehension; it scolds it andscolds humiliates who darethos course and quells apprehension; andthose humiliates to any any alternative. Both in virtue cunning tocontemplate contemplate alternative. Both of in its virtue ofcoordination its cunning co of and admonitions and in virtue pervasiveness, it ofinducements inducements and admonitions and of in its virtue of its perva constitutes a concerted attack attack on women's autonomy with respect to constitutes a concerted on women's autonomy with motherhood. V. A la recherche des voix perdues-pronatalist discourse and discursive insurgency In the previous section, I cited numerous cases in which feminist interpretations succumb to matrigynist distortions, not to condemn this work (in fact, I admire much of it) but rather to demonstrate how transfixing this discursive regime is and how extremely difficult it is to overcome it. How, then, does matrigyno-idolatry undercut women's self-determination with respect to motherhood decisions? From the standpoint of women's autonomy, the trouble with matrigyno-idolatry is epistemological rather than metaphysical. It would be misleading to claim that this discourse determines women's choices.32 32 Practice theorists supply useful, nondeterministic accounts of the impact of social struc- tures on perception, choice, and action. Bourdieu maintains that habitus-systems of cogni- tive and conative schemas that embody forgotten cultural history--are "internalized as a second nature" and constitute the dispositions of individual agency (1977, 78-87, 1990, 53-60). Yet, as William Sewell notes, although Bourdieu regards agents as knowledgeable and capable of strategizing, Bourdieu's account snares them in a self-reproducing system that they cannot fundamentally change (1992, 15). Finding this implication implausible, Sewell argues that the complexity of the structural environment renders those very structures vulner- able to replacement, not merely to variation (1992, 16-19). Although Sewell's account illuminates the conditions that make it possible for agents to effect social change, my concern is that his account overlooks the question of how agents examine different directions in which change might go and decide which would be best to pursue. Sherry Ortner's suggestion that we think of agency as embedded in "serious games" - culturally organized options and constraints permeated by power and inequalit--points to the need for this normative dimension of agency but, unfortunately, neglects to theorize it (1996, 12). Likewise, Anthony Giddens offers a helpful account of the role of autobiographical narrative in the constitution of self-identity and agency (1991, 52-55, 76-85). But although Giddens distinguishes "compulsive mastery" from "authentic reflexive monitoring," he describes the feelings of alienation associated with inauthentic self-monitoring instead of providing an account of how authentically reflexive agents construct the stories that ward off these feelings (107). The skills-based account of self-determination that I endorse is meant to address these oversights-i.e., to explicate critical insight and practical intelligence as agentic capacities. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 I 763 Matrigyno-idolatry notwithstanding, procreative outcomes r spectrum, and this diversity belies the charge of determinism. although nearly all women do become mothers, and in a less dir cursive environment more women might refrain, to claim that determined to become mothers is to run roughshod over the in fact that most women very much want to become mothers. To harm of matrigyno-idolatry through recourse to the demon det is to miss its less obvious, more insidious impact: namely, i stifle women's voices by insinuating pronatalist imperatives int portraits and self-narratives. One reason this discourse is objectionable is that it obfusca motivations concerning motherhood.33 As a result, women com the self-knowledge that is necessary for autonomous decision m trigynist figurations frame women's introspection. They render nity feelings and inclinations vivid and compelling, while eclips misgivings, worries, and fears. Since matrigynist figurations tr mute reluctance and resistance, many women who choose mo so on the basis of doctored self-portraits, with pertinent inform brushed out. Women who decide against motherhood by avoi sue and deferring closure maintain a never-enacted materna borrowed from matrigyno-idolatry. Their self-portraits out of with their actions, these women suppress the disparity and sacr omy. Having confronted neither the possibility that some thing important to them than motherhood nor the possibility that th ing out on something that matters deeply to them, their self-k spotty, and their autonomy is impaired. Finally, matrigyno-ido motherhoo the small group of women who explicitly reject motherhood fensive. Fearing (not unreasonably, I should think) that their re be undermined if they open the issue of maternity to untramm tion, many of these women concoct images of the mother as grotesque instead of working on their own self-portraits. Thus, deny feeling any attraction whatsoever to motherhood and seeing any value in it as well. Again women's self-knowledge and their autonomy is called into question. All too often, w self-conceptions that are beholden to matrigyno-idolatry and ne late richly individualized self-portraits. By confounding self-rea matrigyno-idolatry suspends many women's autonomy. In addition, this discourse obstructs women's autonomy by 33 In a similar vein, I examine the role of tropes in the epistemic obfuscat with recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse in Meyers 1997. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 764 I Meyers imagination narrow canfeasible be practically fea imagination into into narrow channels.channels. Options can Options be practically and potentially desirable but subjectively to individuals. W potentially desirable but subjectively unavailable tounavailable individuals. When op- tions subjectively - whether because tions areare not not subjectively available -available whether because one of them over-one of shadows anathematized rival, because irreconcilable needs are shadows its its anathematized rival, because irreconcilable needs are buried, or because alternatives are defensively shunned -autonomy is di because alternatives are defensively shunned -autonomy is diminished.34 Pronatalist doctrine saturates women's consciousness and chokes off the options that are subjectively available to them.35 Having children is the only motherhood scenario the vast majority of women can viscerally imagine in the first person singular mode. Among women who want children, "baby lust" supplants autonomous choice.36 Not having children is the only motherhood scenario a minuscule minority of "deviant" women can viscerally imagine in the first person singular mode. They lock themselves into adamant refusal to treat motherhood as a viable option. Meanwhile, postponers who do not want children deceive themselves into believing that really they do, although they can never find time to fit it in. They cannot stop imagining themselves as mothers, but their self-image is a fan- tasy. In their case, imagination is disconnected from choice and action. Their imaginations disempowered by matrigyno-idolatry, many women find alternative paths agentically unintelligible and ineligible. Desires formed well before the age of consent then become women's destiny, for no other autobiographical narrative has enough credibility to be worth entertaining. The damage inflicted by the hostile discursive environment I have described should not be underestimated. Yet, despite the corrosive ubiquity of matrigyno-idolatry, there are women who make solidly autonomous decisions about whether to become mothers, and, as I argued earlier, it would be good if more women were able to do so. Thus, it is necessary to 34 For a helpful related discussion, see LeVine 1984, 85-86; and Mackenzie 2000. 35 Tragically, adoption is a motherhood scenario that is not subjectively available to many women. Women undergoing fertility treatment often are seen and see themselves as heroic- true devotees of the cult of motherhood. In light of the risk and expense of technologyassisted reproduction and many existing children's desperate need for homes, it is a pity that women discount the adoption option so readily. 36 Bartky's discussion of sexual fantasies (see Sec. III) seems especially germane to the question of motherhood in light of Nancy Friday's 1998 documentation of "earth mother" fantasies. Women who indulge in these fantasies enhance their sexual pleasure by picturing fertility imagery. Although Friday gives no indication of how prevalent these fantasies are, their existence surely demonstrates how deeply embedded in one's psychic structure mother- hood imperatives can be. Notice, though, that just as fantasizing rape during consensual intercourse does not entail wanting to be raped, fantasizing impregnation during intercourse does not entail wanting to have a baby. Autonomy with respect to motherhood decisions remains feasible. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 I 765 inquire into introspection and imagination skills some that enab inquire into thethe introspection and imagination skills that enable women outwit the matrigynist figurative regime that compromi women toto outwit the matrigynist figurative regime that compromises so manywomen's women's autonomy in to order better understand how fe many autonomy in order bettertounderstand how feminists mightintervene intervene in matrigynist discourse to hold break its hold on w might in matrigynist discourse to break its on women's lives.After After describing two strategies of dissident self-figuratio lives. describing two strategies of dissident self-figuration that women have used to gain autonomy -lyric transfiguration women have used to gain autonomy -lyric transfiguration and appropria-and appro tion/adaptation -I shall outline and changes discursive tion/adaptation -I shall outline several several social andsocial discursive that chan areneeded needed secure women's capacities for self-determination. are to to secure women's capacities for self-determination. Thestrategy strategy of lyric transfiguration involves literary exploiting The of lyric transfiguration involves exploiting tech-literary niquestoto fashion individualized one's subjective niques fashion individualized imageryimagery expressingexpressing one's subjective view- pointand and one's sense of identity. one's identity. Julia poetic Kristeva's poetic point one's sense of one's Julia Kristeva's evocation of evocat herexperience experience of motherhood in Mater" "Stabat is a well-known her of motherhood in "Stabat is Mater" a well-known example of lyric lyric transfiguration (Kristeva the personificat of transfiguration (Kristeva 1987).37 1987).37 Rejecting Rejecting the personification of motherhood in the figure the Mary, Virgin Mary, Kristeva creates motherhood in the figure of theof Virgin Kristeva creates a prose poeminin which exquisite imagery of sensuousness delicate sensuousness alterna poem which exquisite imagery of delicate alternates with wrenching imagery of pain, turmoil, and dislocation. wrenching imagery of pain, turmoil, and dislocation. In capturing In hercapturi uniqueapprehension apprehension of maternity, Kristeva's text transfigures unique of maternity, Kristeva's text transfigures motherhood moth forherself herself her readers, are less gif for andand for for somesome of herof readers, too. Thosetoo. who Those are less who gifted than Kristeva, however, might take encouragement from Jeanne Kristeva, however, might take encouragement from Jeanne Safer's model. Safer's Saferrecounts recounts a series of dreams vivid dreams that she as interprets Safer a series of vivid that she interprets bearing on as herbearin decision about motherhood decision about motherhood (Safer (Safer 1996, 12,1996, 22-25,12, 35, 22-25, 36). The 35, se- 36). quenceculminates culminates a tableau of a "with garden "with fountain a restored quence in a in tableau of a garden a restored and foun cantaloupes growing [her]property parents' cantaloupes on on the the vine,vine, growing on [her]on parents' inproperty the dead ofin the d winter," which construes as a metaphor for her winter," which she she construes as a metaphor for her decision not decision to have not children (1996, The water the fountain children (1996, 36). 36). The water flowingflowing from thefrom fountain and the fruit and t flourishing despite the represent cold represent "new of definition of fertility flourishing despite the cold her "newher definition fertility" with- outmotherhood motherhood (1996, 37). By tapping into her personal nocturn out (1996, 37). By tapping into her personal nocturnal reser- voirofof figurations - a resource to everyoneesca voir figurations - a resource availableavailable to everyoneSafer escapesSafer the graspofof matrigynist figurations and consolidates a positive vision o grasp matrigynist figurations and consolidates a positive vision of herself as a childfree woman. A second approach - appropriation/adaptation - is taken by one of Mardy Ireland's subjects whom she calls Judith. Judith, a photographer who has chosen not to have children, characterizes the help she gives younger women artists, such as selecting and preparing their work for exhi- bitions, as her "midwifery" (Ireland 1993, 82). In choosing this trope, Judith joins a tradition going back at least as far as Socrates in which women's service to one another in the birthing process is used to symbolize the assistance men give to other men in their creative labors. What is unusual about Judith's appropriation of this trope is that she is a woman. Whether 37 For a related discussion, see Nussbaum 1990, 150-60. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 766 I Meyers because few women have historically been scholars, writers, or a because women have lacked sufficient distance from their repro to use it as a self-referential trope, women have seldom invoked productive activities as metaphors for their own intellectual creativity (Kittay 1988, 78-80). But through appropriation/ad this hoary trope, Judith carves out a spot for herself in the gen ment and provides herself with a guiding image of her unor trajectory. To accomplish these aims, she becomes a discursiv only does she refuse the matrigynist conflation of womanhood erhood that would render her trope unilluminating, but she also trope from the cultural storehouse and freely adapts it to suit h tive activities and self-concept. Of course, appropriation/adaptation need not be confined to r procreative imagery. Indeed, this particular appropriation/adapt be viewed as a calculated risk. Symbolizing professional and artis ity as procreativity, or symbolizing various generous practi mentoring and volunteer work, as nurturance, flirts perilously ing women's variegated accomplishments and contributions tions of maternal impulses. To avoid replaying the essentialist m equation and reaffirming the antifeminist dogma that no "tr can repudiate motherhood, women might be well-advised to seek ages, allegorical tales, or exemplary biographical narratives that ture reproductive motifs. These, too, could be individualized and as psychic beacons.38 Whatever literary forms are employed, th is important for women's autonomy is that, whether they ch come mothers or not, they find discursive means to symbolize th ular relations to motherhood and through these self-figurations homogenization in matrigynist ideology Kristeva, Safer, and Judith all augment their autonomy by find fin own voices. Firmly repudiating matrigynist imagery, they insis their self-portraits in personal imagery. It is evident, then, tha interpreting and critiquing prevalent figurations of motherhood in accessing and adapting figurative materials from diverse sour essary if women are to extricate themselves from matrigyno-id gain autonomy with respect to motherhood. Still, for purposes o omy, discursive innovation is not by itself enough. To enable women's novel self-figurations must be screened for aptness 38 For a wonderful example of appropriating and adapting an allegorical ta not, however, concern the issue of motherhood, see Mahoney and Yngvesson This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 I 767 tiousness-does -does a heterodox figuration the woman's tiousness a heterodox figuration betterbetter expressexpress the woman's sense of who whoshe she and what matters to Is her? Is it to likely to facilitate of is is and what matters to her? it likely facilitate her abilityher to abili undertakeprojects projects pursue that sheare feels are truly undertake andand pursue goals goals that she feels truly her own? her Will own? it help helpher her explain herself to others gain their understan it toto explain herself to others and toand gainto their understanding, respect,and, and, perhaps, support? and To answer these questions, d respect, perhaps, support? and so on.so Toon. answer these questions, dis- cursiveinsurgents insurgents must master the of imaginatively cursive must master the art ofart imaginatively trying ontrying tropes on tro (Meyers1994, 1994, 108-15). They anticipate (Meyers 108-15). They mustmust anticipate what itwhat woulditbewould like tobe lik inhabita aproposed proposed figuration by constructing scenarios inhabit figuration by constructing scenarios in whichin thewhich figu- the f rationguides guides their conduct andviscerally by viscerally imagining themselves act ration their conduct and by imagining themselves acting out those scenarios. Those figurations that survive this vetting must become embedded in the cognitive and emotional structures that shape agency and that function as criteria of self-appraisal. To psychically integrate dissident selffigurations, women must command skills that enable them to invest emotionally in these tropes and to reconfigure their patterns of thought and volition in accordance with them.39 By devising imagery that expresses her identity and assimilating the imagery in this way, a woman enriches and individualizes her self-portrait, defines herself in her own terms, and makes her desire her own. Barring unforeseen countervailing circumstances, then, she gains a substantial degree of autonomy over a major life decision. Since the skills I have described are learned, proficiency develops as a result of instruction and practice. Teaching these skills requires parental and pedagogical methods that encourage children to profit from idiosyncrasy and reverie and that foster their receptivity to unfamiliar ideas and rhetorics, their originality and inventiveness, and their delight in individu- ality. Unfortunately, child rearing is currently geared to conformism-teaching children what is expected of them and how to meet those demands. Most children are subjected to a repressive, deadening, incentivedriven regimen that does little to cultivate the autonomy skills women need and that crushes children's potential when it does not turn them into angry, deracinated misfits. Unless child care and schooling are reformed, then, women's autonomy with respect to becoming mothers will remain a privilege reserved for a lucky elite--typically, women brought up in enlightened households and affluent women who have access to progressive psychotherapists. To democratize women's autonomy, caregivers and educators must modify their practices and actively promote skills that enable women to discern the detrimental impact of matrigynist figurations on 39 For a discussion of the role of metaphor in self-knowledge and agency, see Kristeva 1987, 14-16, 276, 381. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 768 I Meyers lives, to to envisage envisage dissident dissident figurations, figurations,and andto toentrust entrusttheir their their lives, figurations that that augment augment their their fulfillment fulfillmentand andenhance enhancethei th those figurations esteem. It is not the case that any woman with enough gumption a talent can bootstrap her way to autonomous control over whethe to become a mother. On the contrary, women's procreative auton supposes a social commitment to values and competencies that hav tofore received plenty of lip service and scant tangible supp designing child rearing to cultivate women's autonomy skills is v such reform addresses only part of the problem, for it does not challenge the overarching matrigynist discursive context. Plainly, a discursive vacuum is not a viable antidote for cult trenched and transmitted matrigynist tropes. Having a child some an experience and too crucial to society for motherhood to over in cultural silence. It does not follow, though, that femi stomach matrigyno-idolatry and its pernicious effects on women omy. Feminist authors and artists can counter matrigyno-ido matrigyno-iconoclasm-that is, they can generate alternative maternity and femininity to supplant matrigynist ones.40 Fo spotlighting the mother who laughs, the mother who knows sexu sure, and the mother who is angry would help to displace th tropes of the beatific, selfless mother and mother-child fusion.4 add, too, that feminist images of mature women disassociated fr erhood-the woman who writes, the woman who performs, th who explores, the woman who leads, the postmenopausal wom anything(!) - are indispensable to the subversion of matrigyno-id In the same way that masochistic imagery has colonized many 40 For a general account of feminist counterfigurative politics, see Meyers 1 41 See Hirsch 1989, 170; Suleiman 1994, 278-81; and Isaak 1996, 142. Alth not sanguine about displacing the culturally entrenched tropes of the beatific mother-child fusion, my prognosis is less pessimistic than Jessica Benjamin's. Benj that they are beyond the reach of feminist critique and that the only solution mind that they are fantasies, not truths, about maternity (1994, 132, 134, 141, that orthodox maternal tropes are firmly ensconced in culture and that they ar by individuals. Moreover, I readily concede that dislodging them will be a slow process. Nevertheless, what I think this shows is that the feminist project of cultu mation is radical in the sense of requiring reconstruction of the fundaments o that this project is futile. In the meantime, though, it is imperative to distinguish motherhood from realities, for women to foreground that distinction when they becoming mothers themselves, and for everyone to be aware of that distinction acting with their mothers. For a relevant, very insightful discussion of the pr representing the mother who is angry, see Hirsch 1989, chap. 5, esp. 192-96. This content downloaded from 137.99.170.3 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:31:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms S I G N S Spring 2001 I 769 sexualfantasy fantasy matrigynist hasmany colonized many sexual life,life, matrigynist imageryimagery has colonized women's repro-women's ductive imaginaries. Feminist counterfigurative initiatives to fa ductive imaginaries. Feminist counterfigurative initiatives aim to fashionaim a benign discursive environment thatwomen offers an array of selfbenign discursive environment that offers an women array of self-images andthat that underwrites wide of range and aspirations. and underwrites a widea range valuesof andvalues aspirations. Coupled with Coupled efforts ensure individual women acquire the autonomy skill efforts toto ensure that that individual women acquire the autonomy skills they needtoto make selections a pluralistic stockand oftotropes and to tailo need make selections from from a pluralistic stock of tropes tailor those tropestoto their distinctive needs, temperaments, capabilities, and tropes fitfit their distinctive needs, temperaments, capabilities, and hopes, thislatitudinarian latitudinarian setting a key social this setting would would secure a secure key social condition forcondition the eman- for th cipation women's self-visioning powers and thus for women's aut cipation ofof women's self-visioning powers and thus for women's autonomy overbecoming becoming mothers. over mothers. Department of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University Connecticut - Storrs University of of Connecticut - Storrs References Addelson, Kathryn Pyne. 1994. 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